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Abstrat: This report presents new four-round integral properties against the Rijndael ipher with blok
sizes larger than 128 bits. Using higher-order multiset distinguishers and other well-known extensions of those
properties, the dedued attaks reah up to 7 and 8 rounds of Rijndael variants with 160 up to 256-bit bloks.
For example, a 7-rounds attak against Rijndael-224 has a time omplexity equal to 280.
Key-words: blok ipher, ryptanalysis, integral attaks, Rijndael-b
Amélioration des attaques intégrales ontre Rijndael
Résumé : Ce rapport présente de nouvelles propriétés intégrales pour les variantes de Rijndael pour des blos
de tailles supérieures à 128 bits. En utilisant des distingueurs partiuliers et des extensions d'attaques onnues,
les propriétés déduites permettent d'attaquer 7 et 8 étages de Rijndael.
Mots-lés : hirement par blos, ryptanalyses, attaques intégrales, Rijndael-b
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1 Introdution
Rijndael-b is an SPN blok ipher designed by Vinent Rijmen and Joan Daemen [4℄. It has been hosen as the
new advaned enryption standard by the NIST [6℄ with a 128-bit blok size and a variable key length, whih
an be set to 128, 192 or 256 bits. In its full version, the blok lengths b and the key lengths Nk an range
from 128 up to 256 bits in steps of 32 bits, as detailed in [3℄ and in [8℄. There are 25 instanes of Rijndael. The
number of rounds Nr depends on the text size b and on the key size Nk and varies between 10 and 14 (see
Table 1 for partial details). For all the versions, the urrent blok at the input of the round r is represented by
a 4× t with t = (b/32) matrix of bytes A(r):
A(r) =


a
(r)
0,0 a
(r)
0,1 · · · a
(r)
0,t
a
(r)
1,0 a
(r)
1,1 · · · a
(r)
1,t
a
(r)
2,0 a
(r)
2,1 · · · a
(r)
2,t
a
(r)
3,0 a
(r)
3,1 · · · a
(r)
3,t


The round funtion, repeated Nr − 1 times, involves four elementary mappings, all linear exept the rst
one:
 SubBytes: a bytewise transformation that applies on eah byte of the urrent blok an 8-bit to 8-bit non
linear S-box S.
 ShiftRows: a linear mapping that rotates on the left all the rows of the urrent matrix. the values of the
shifts (given in Table 1) depend on b.
 MixColumns: a linear matrix multipliation; eah olumn of the input matrix is multiplied by the matrix
M that provides the orresponding olumn of the output matrix.
 AddRoundKey: an x-or between the urrent blok and the subkey of the round r Kr.
Those Nr − 1 rounds are surrounded at the top by an initial key addition with the subkey K0 and at the
bottom by a nal transformation omposed by a all to the round funtion where the MixColumns operation
is omitted. The key shedule derives Nr + 1 b-bits round keys K0 to KNr from the master key K of variable
length.
AES Rijndael-160 Rijndael-192 Rijndael-224 Rijndael-256
ShiftRows (1,2,3) (1,2,3) (1,2,3) (1,2,4) (1,3,4)
Nb rounds (Nk=128) 10 11 12 13 14
Nb rounds (Nk=192) 12 12 12 13 14
Nb rounds (Nk=256) 14 14 14 14 14
Table 1: Parameters of the Rijndael blok ipher where the triplet (i, j, k) for the ShiftRows operation designated
the required number of byte shifts for the seond row, the third one and the fourth one.
Many ryptanalyses have been proposed against Rijndael-b, the rst one against all the versions of Rijndael-b
is due to the algorithm designers themselves and is based upon integral properties ([1℄, [2℄, [10℄) that allows to
eiently distinguish 3 Rijndael inner rounds from a random permutation. This attak has been improved by
Ferguson et al. in [5℄ allowing to ryptanalyse an 8 rounds version of Rijndael-b with a omplexity equal to 2204
trial enryptions and 2128 − 2119 plaintexts.
Following the dediated work of [7℄, this paper presents new four-round integral properties of Rijndael-b and
the resulting 7 and 8 rounds attaks whih are substantially faster than exhaustive key searh. Note also that
those attaks greatly improve the previous results on Rijndael-b, essentially the ones given in [8℄ and in [9℄.
This paper is organized as follows: Setion 2 realls the integral properties known against Rijndael-b and
investigates the new four and ve rounds properties. Setion 3 presents the dedued 7 and 8 rounds attaks.
Setion 4 onludes this paper.
2 The integral properties
We desribe in this setion the four inner rounds original integral property against the AES desribed in [5℄,
the ve rounds integral property of Rijndael-256 desribed in [7℄ and the new integral properties against all the
Rijndael-b versions where b is larger than 128 bits.
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2.1 Introdution and Notations
In [10℄, L. Knudsen and D. Wagner analyse integral ryptanalysis as a dual to dierential attaks partiularly
appliable to blok iphers with bijetive omponents. A rst-order integral ryptanalysis onsiders a partiular
olletion of m words in the plaintexts and iphertexts that dier on a partiular omponent. The aim of this
attak is thus to predit the values in the sums (i.e. the integral) of the hosen words after a ertain number
of rounds of enryption. The same authors also generalize this approah to higher-order integrals: the original
set to onsider beomes a set of md vetors whih dier in d omponents and where the sum of this set is
preditable after a ertain number of rounds. The sum of this set is alled a dth-order integral.
2.1.1 Notations
We rst introdue and extend the onsistent notations proposed in [10℄ for expressing word-oriented integral
attaks. For a rst order integral, we have:
 The symbol `C' (for Constant) in the ith entry, means that the values of all the ith words in the olletion
of texts are equal.
 The symbol `A' (for All) means that all words in the olletion of texts are dierent.
 The symbol `S' (for Sum) means that the sum of all ith words an be predited.
 The symbol `?' means that the sum of words an not be predited.
For a dth order integral ryptanalysis:
 The symbol `Ad' orresponds with the omponents that partiipate in a dth-order integral, i.e. if a word
an take m dierent values then Ad means that in the integral, the partiular word takes all values exatly
md−1 times.
 The term `Adi ' means that in the integral the string onatenation of all words with subsript i take the
md values exatly one.
 The symbol `(Adi )
k
' means that in the integral the string onatenation of all words with subsript i take
the md values exatly k times.
 The symbol `Eqi' found for two dierent words means that the sums of all values taken on those partiular
words are equal.
2.1.2 Integral properties of the AES
In order to well understand the priniples of an integral property, we give the example of the AES (Rijndael-
128). Consider a olletion of 256 texts, whih have dierent values in one byte and equal values in all other
bytes. Then it follows that after two rounds of enryption the texts take all 256 values in eah of the sixteen
bytes, and that after three rounds of enryption the sum of the 256 bytes in eah position is zero as shown in
[2℄. Also, note that there are 16 suh integrals sine the position of the non-onstant byte in the plaintexts an
be in any of the sixteen bytes. The integral is illustrated in Figure 1 (where an arrow represents a omplete
round). This integral an be used to attak four rounds of Rijndael-128 with small omplexity (note that the
nal round is speial and does not inlude MixColumns) ounting over one key byte at a time. Simply guess a
key byte and ompute byte-wise bakwards to hek if the sum of all 256 values is zero.
This 3-round property ould be extended by one round at the beginning using 232 plaintexts, i.e. to a
4th-order integral property as desribed in [5℄. The main observation is that the 232 plaintexts ould be seen as
224 opies of the above rst-order integrals (starting in the seond round). Sine the text in eah integral sums
to zero in any byte after the fourth round, so does the sum of all 232 plaintexts. The running time omplexity
of this attak greatly improves the previous one espeially onerning the key-bytes searh. Figure 2 depits
this four-round fourth-order integral against Rijndael-128.
A C C C
C C C C
C C C C
C C C C
→
A C C C
A C C C
A C C C
A C C C
→
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
→
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S
Figure 1: The 3-round rst-order integral for Rijndael-128, where S = 0
2.1.3 An integral property for Rijndael-256
In [7℄, the authors show a new 3th-order integral property against 4-round of Rijndael-256 whih essentially
relies on the slow diusion of Rijndael-256. Using the previous notations, we ould easily desribe this property
as shown on Figure 3.
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A40 C C C
C A40 C C
C C A40 C
C C C A40
→
A40 C C C
A40 C C C
A40 C C C
A40 C C C
→
A41 A
4
1 A
4
1 A
4
1
A42 A
4
2 A
4
2 A
4
2
A43 A
4
3 A
4
3 A
4
3
A44 A
4
4 A
4
4 A
4
4
→
A4 A4 A4 A4
A4 A4 A4 A4
A4 A4 A4 A4
A4 A4 A4 A4
→
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S
Figure 2: A 4-round fourth-order integral for Rijndael-128 with 232 texts.
A30 C C C C C C C
A30 C C C C C C C
A30 C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C
→
A30 C C C C C A
3
0 A
3
0
A31 C C C C C A
3
1 A
3
1
A32 C C C C C A
3
2 A
3
2
A33 C C C C C A
3
3 A
3
3
→
A20 C A
2
0 A
2
4 A
2
4 A
3
0 A
3
0 A
3
0
A21 C A
2
1 A
2
5 A
2
5 A
3
1 A
3
1 A
3
1
A22 C A
2
2 A
2
6 A
2
6 A
3
2 A
3
2 A
3
2
A23 C A
2
3 A
2
7 A
2
7 A
3
3 A
3
3 A
3
3
→
? A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3 A3
? A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3 A3
? A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3 A3
? A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3 A3
→
? ? S ? ? ? S ?
? ? S ? ? ? S ?
? ? S ? ? ? S ?
? ? S ? ? ? S ?
Figure 3: 4-round 3th-order integral property of Rijndael-256
As shown in [7℄, this partiular property ould be extended by one round at the beginning using a 4th-
order integral (onsidering that it represents 28 opies of the 3th-order four round integral) to build a 5-round
distinguisher that uses 232 plaintexts testing if the sum taken over all initial values of a partiular byte belonging
to the third or to the seventh olumn is equal to zero. This leads to the rst 9-round attak against Rijndael-256.
2.2 The new integral properties of Rijndael-b
In this setion, we present new integral properties against Rijndael-b. Those properties have been found using
always the same methodology: onsider after one round a full olumn of ative bytes, say (y0, y1, y2, y3), then
after two rounds, express eah byte of the orresponding iphertext aording to this olumn. Thus, one ould
see the dependenies between two rounds bytes and an diretly dedue the bytes that must take all possible
values to obtain balaned bytes at the end of the third round and thus preditable sums at the end of the fourth
round.
2.2.1 Rijndael-256
We have found an other 4-round integral property of 2th-order as shown in gure 4. Using omputer simulations,
we have found 42 3th-order integral properties and 48 2th-order integral property (essentially the shifted ones).
As previously done, this 2th-order four-round property ould be extended by one round at the beginning
using a 8th-order integral (onsidering that it represents 248 opies of the 2th-order four round integral) as
previously desribed and by two rounds at the beginning using a 24th-order integral as done in [8℄ and as shown
in Figure 5.
Thus, we obtain rst a four-round distinguisher that uses 216 plaintexts testing if the sum taken over all
initial values of a partiular byte belonging to the third, to the sixth, to the seventh or to the eighth olumn is
equal to zero. We also obtain a ve-round distinguisher that uses 264 plaintexts testing if the same sum taken
over the 264 values is also equal to zero. The six-round distinguisher that uses 2192 plaintexts is the same even
if the orresponding memory omplexity is here unreahable.
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A20 C C C C C C C
C A20 C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C
→
A20 C C C C C C C
A20 C C C C C C C
A21 C C C C C C C
A21 C C C C C C C
→
A20 C C C A
2
0 A
2
4 C A
2
4
A21 C C C A
2
1 A
2
5 C A
2
5
A22 C C C A
2
2 A
2
6 C A
2
6
A23 C C C A
2
3 A
2
7 C A
2
7
→
A2 A2 A2 A2 ? A2 A2 A2
A2 A2 A2 A2 ? A2 A2 A2
A2 A2 A2 A2 ? A2 A2 A2
A2 A2 A2 A2 ? A2 A2 A2
→
? ? S ? ? S S S
? ? S ? ? S S S
? ? S ? ? S S S
? ? S ? ? S S S
Figure 4: the 2th-order integral property of Rijndael-256
A240 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 C C
C A240 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 C
A21 C C A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0
A21 A
24
0 C C A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0 A
24
0
→
A80 A
8
0 C C C C C C
C A80 A
8
0 C C C C C
C C C A80 A
8
0 C C C
C C C C A80 A
8
0 C C
→
A20 C C C C C C C
C A20 C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C
Figure 5: Extension of Rijndael-256 by two rounds at the beginning using a 24th-order integral
2.2.2 Rijndael-224
In the same way, we have found a 2th-order 4-round integral property for Rijndael-224 as shown in gure 6.
We have found 42 2th-order integral properties (essentially the shifted ones).
A20 C C C C C C
C A20 C C C C C
C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C
→
A20 C C C C C C
A20 C C C C C C
A21 C C C C C C
A21 C C C C C C
→
A20 C C A
2
0 C A
2
4 A
2
4
A21 C C A
2
1 C A
2
5 A
2
5
A22 C C A
2
2 C A
2
6 A
2
6
A23 C C A
2
3 C A
2
7 A
2
7
→
A2 A2 A2 ? A2 ? ?
A2 A2 A2 ? A2 ? ?
A2 A2 A2 ? A2 ? ?
A2 A2 A2 ? A2 ? ?
→
S ? ? ? ? ? ?
S ? ? ? ? ? ?
S ? ? ? ? ? ?
S ? ? ? ? ? ?
Figure 6: Four-round 2th-order integral property of Rijndael-224
As previously done, this 2th-order four-round property ould be extended by one round at the beginning
using a 8th-order integral (onsidering that it represents 248 opies of the 2th-order four-round integral) as
previously desribed and by two rounds at the beginning using a 24th-order integral.
Thus, we obtain rst a four-round distinguisher that uses 216 plaintexts testing if the sum taken over all
initial values of a partiular byte belonging to the rst olumn is equal to zero. We also obtain a ve-round
distinguisher that uses 264 plaintexts testing if the same sum taken over the 264 values is also equal to zero.
The six-round distinguisher that uses 2192 plaintexts is the same.
2.2.3 Rijndael-192
In the same way, we have found a 2th-order 4-round integral property for Rijndael-192 as shown in gure 7.
This integral is dierent from the others beause it implies that two partiular sums are equals between them
and not to zero. This partiular property omes from the fat that the rst term Eq0 is a linear ombination
of 4 partiular terms of the previous round. In those words, three are balaned (i.e. the omplete sum at the
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end is equal to 0) and the last one omes from a `?' of the previous round. Thus, we obtain in fat the simple
sum of the word `?', more preisely the sum beomes after the Mixolumns
⊕
v∈A2
0
01 · ‘?′ ⊕ 0 where 0 is the
null sum taken over the three balaned bytes. Then, notie that the seond term Eq0 is omputed from exatly
the same 4 words and that the oeient of the Mixolumns applied to the same word `?' is also 01. Thus, we
obtain two equal sums. In fat, on this partiular olumn, we obtain 6 possible equalities up to the MixColumns
oeient.
A20 C C C C C
C A20 C C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C C C
→
A20 C C C C C
A20 C C C C C
A21 C C C C C
A21 C C C C C
→
A20 C C A
2
0 A
2
4 A
2
4
A21 C C A
2
1 A
2
5 A
2
5
A22 C C A
2
2 A
2
6 A
2
6
A23 C C A
2
3 A
2
7 A
2
7
→
A3 A3 ? ? ? A3
A3 A3 ? ? ? A3
A3 A3 ? ? ? A3
A3 A3 ? ? ? A3
→
? ? ? ? ? Eq1
? ? ? ? Eq0 Eq1
? ? ? ? Eq0 ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
Figure 7: 2th-order 4-round integral property of Rijndael-192
We also have found a 3th-order 4-round integral property for Rijndael-192 as shown in gure 8. We have
found 42 2th-order integral properties (essentially the shifted ones).
A30 C C C C C
C A30 C C C C
C C A30 C C C
C C C C C C
→
(A20)
256 C C C C C
(A20)
256 C C C C C
(A21)
256 C C C C C
(A21)
256 C C C C C
→
(A20)
256 C C (A20)
256 A24)
256 (A24)
256
(A21)
256 C C (A21)
256 (A25)
256 (A25)
256
(A22)
256 C C (A22)
256 (A26)
256 (A26)
256
(A23)
256 C C (A23)
256 (A27)
256 (A27)
256
→
A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3
A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3
A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3
A3 A3 A3 ? A3 A3
→
? ? ? ? S S
? ? ? ? S S
? ? ? ? S S
? ? ? ? S S
Figure 8: 3th-order 4-round integral property of Rijndael-192
As previously done, the 2th-order four-round integral ould be extended by one round at the beginning using
a 8th-order integral (onsidering that it represents 248 opies of the 2th-order four-round integral) testing if the
sums of two partiular bytes are equals and by two rounds at the beginning using a 24th-order integral. In this
ase, we obtain exatly the same distinguisher than the ones desribed in the previous subsetions.
In the ase of the 3th-order four-round integral, it ould be easily extended by one round at the beginning
using a 12th-order integral (onsidering that it represents 272 opies of the 3th-order four-round integral). But
if we try to add one more round at the beginning, we need to onsider the entire odebook of Rijndael-192,
what is not possible (beause, as mentioned in [5℄, in this ase in the key bytes searh even the wrong keys will
yield to zero when summing over all 2192 enryptions beause Rijndael-192 is a permutation). Thus, in this
ase, we need to use the herd tehnique proposed in [5℄ and detailed in the Subsetion 3.2.
In onlusion, we obtain rst a four-round distinguisher that uses 224 plaintexts testing if the sum taken
over all initial values of a partiular byte belonging to the fth or the sixth olumn is equal to zero. We also
obtain a ve-round distinguisher that uses 292 plaintexts testing if the same sum taken over the 292 values is
also equal to zero.
2.2.4 Rijndael-160
We also have found a 3th-order 4-round integral property for Rijndael-160 as shown in gure 9. We have found
42 3th-order integral properties (essentially the shifted ones).
Thus, we ould easily extend by one round at the beginning this integral using a 12th-order integral (on-
sidering that it represents 272 opies of the 3th-order four-round integral). We ould not add one more round
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A30 C C C C
C A30 C C C
C C A30 C C
C C C C C
→
(A20)
256 C C C C
(A20)
256 C C C C
(A21)
256 C C C C
(A21)
256 C C C C
→
(A20)
256 C (A20)
256 (A24)
256 (A24)
256
(A21)
256 C (A21)
256 (A25)
256 (A25)
256
(A22)
256 C (A22)
256 (A26)
256 (A26)
256
(A23)
256 C (A23)
256 (A27)
256 (A27)
256
→
A3 A3 ? A3 A3
A3 A3 ? A3 A3
A3 A3 ? A3 A3
A3 A3 ? A3 A3
→
? ? ? S ?
? ? ? S ?
? ? ? S ?
? ? ? S ?
Figure 9: Integral property of Rijndael-160
at the beginning, for the same reasons than the ones given in the ase of Rijndael-192. Thus, in this ase, we
need to use the herd tehnique proposed in [5℄.
Thus, we obtain rst a four-round distinguisher that uses 224 plaintexts testing if the sum taken over all
initial values of a partiular byte belonging to the fourth olumn is equal to zero. We also obtain a ve-round
distinguisher that uses 292 plaintexts testing if the same sum taken over the 292 values is also equal to zero.
3 The proposed attaks
We ould exploit the 4, 5 and 6-round integral properties previously desribed to mount elementary attaks
against 6, 7 and 8 rounds versions of Rijndael-b using the partial sums tehnique desribed in [5℄ to add two
rounds at the end. To attak the 8-round versions of Rijndael-192 and Rijndael-160, we introdue the herd
tehnique also desribed in [5℄.
3.1 The partial sums tehnique
We ould extend the previous 5-round and 6-round distinguishers by adding two rounds at the end using the
partial sums tehnique introdued in [5℄. We desribe here the original attak and then diretly apply it to our
ase.
This extension works in the original paper on a 6 rounds version of the AES and looks at a partiular byte of
A(5) to test the 4th-order integral property desribed in Figure 2 and how it relates to the iphertext. First, the
authors rewrite the ipher slightly by putting the AddRoundKey before the MixColumns in round 5. Instead
of applying MixColumns and then adding K5, they rst add in K
′
5, whih is a linear ombination of four bytes
of K5, and then apply MixColumns. Under this assumption, it is easy to see that any byte of A
(5)
depends on
the iphertext, on four bytes of K6 and one byte of K
′
5 onsidering that the sixth round is the last one and does
not ontain a MixColumns operation. Then, only the ve key bytes of the two last rounds remain unknowns.
Moreover, the authors improve the omplexity of their attak using a tehnique alled partial sums to
sequentially deipher the two last rounds aording to the values of the ve unknown key bytes. They rst
ompute from the i-th iphertext ci the following partial sums: ∀k ∈ {0, · · · , 3}, xk :=
∑k
j=0 Sj [ci,j ⊕ kj ]where
S0, S1, S2, S3 represent the inverse of the S-box S multiplied by a omponent of InvMixColumns, ci,j the byte
number j of ci; k0, · · · , k3 the four bytes of K6. Note that the searhed value at the end of the 4 rounds is thus
a
(5)
i,j = S
−1[x3 ⊕ k4] where k4 is the implied byte of K
′
5.
They use the transformation (c0, c1, c2, c3) → (xk, ck+1 , · · · , c3) to sequentially determine the dierent values
of kk and to share the global omputation into 4 steps of key bytes searh with 2
48
operations for eah one
orresponding with 250 S-box lookups for eah set of 232 iphertexts (see [5℄ for the details of the omplexities).
To disard false alarms (i.e. bad keys that pass the test), they need to repeat this proess on 6 dierent sets with
232 elements. Then, the general omplexity of the partial sums attaks against a 6 rounds version of the AES is
about 244 enryptions (onsidering that 28 S-box appliations are roughly equivalent with one trial enryption)
using 6 · 232 plaintexts.
We ould diretly apply this tehnique to all the versions of Rijndael-b to reover 5 partiular key bytes of
the two last rounds using 6 dierent sets of plaintexts. We sum up the orresponding results in Table 2. Note
also that when looking at the 2th-order four-round integral of Rijndael-192, one needs to guess in parallel 2× 5
key bytes. The partial sums tehnique ould however be applied 2 times but all the rst 5 guessed key bytes
must be stored. We thus inrease the required memory. Note also, as done in [5℄, that we ould add at the end
of the two rounds added using the partial sums tehnique a last round guessing 4 partiular olumns of the last
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subkey. In this ase, we perform an exhaustive searh on 16 subkey bytes whereas the 5 other key bytes are
determined using always the partial sums tehnique. The orresponding results are also given in Table 2.
Cipher nb Key Data Time Memory Attak
rounds sizes Complexity
Rijndael-256 6 (all) 2 · 216 CP 232 216 2th-order integral
7 (all) 6 · 264 CP 280 264 8th-order integral
8 > 192 6 · 2192 CP 2208 2192 24th-order integral
8 (192) 19 · 264 CP 2191 264 8th-order integral
8 (256) 21 · 264 CP 2207 264 8th-order integral
Rijndael-224 6 (all) 2 · 216 CP 232 216 2th-order integral
7 (all) 6 · 264 CP 280 264 8th-order integral
8 > 192 6 · 2192 CP 2208 2192 24th-order integral
8 (192) 19 · 264 CP 2191 264 8th-order integral
8 (256) 21 · 264 CP 2207 264 8th-order integral
Rijndael-192 6 (all) 2 · 216 CP 233 216 2th-order integral
7 (all) 6 · 264 CP 281 2104 8th-order integral
6 (all) 2 · 224 CP 240 224 3th-order integral
7 (all) 6 · 292 CP 2108 292 12th-order integral
8 (256) 21 · 264 CP 2208 2104 8th-order integral
Rijndael-160 6 (all) 2 · 224 CP 240 224 3th-order integral
7 (all) 6 · 292 CP 2108 292 12th-order integral
Table 2: Summary of Attaks on Rijndael-b using the partial sums tehnique
3.2 The herd tehnique for Rijndael-192 and Rijndael-160
In [5℄, the authors develop a tehnique to improve their 6 rounds AES attak by adding one round at the
beginning. This new attak require naively the entire odebook of 2128 known plaintexts that ould be divided
into 296 paks of 232 plaintexts/iphertexts that represent 224 rst-order integrals with one ative byte after
two rounds. But this property ould not be diretly exploited beause in this ase even the wrong keys pass the
test due to the bijetive behavior of the ipher.
Instead, they use a partiular byte at the end of the rst round, say a
(2)
a,b dierent from the four bytes implied
in the integral with a xed value x. With a
(2)
a,b = x, they obtain a set of 2
120
possible enryptions omposed of
288 paks, where eah pak ontains 224 4th-order integrals. They all this struture with 2120 elements a herd.
If they sum up values on a herd, then the integral property is only preserved for the orret key.
Thus, they notie that this partiular byte a
(2)
a,b depends on only four bytes of plaintext, say (p4, · · · , p7) and
on four bytes of the key K0. As done for the partial sums tehnique, they ould share the key exhaustive searh
on the four key bytes of K0 required to entirely determine the value of a
(1)
a,b in a three-phase attak using 2
64
ounters my for the rst phase, 2
32
ounters nz for the seond whereas the third phase lters information for
key guesses. The attak works as follows: in the rst phase, the ounter my is inremented at bit level aording
to the 64-bit value y = (c0, · · · , c3, p4, · · · , p7); in the seond phase, the four bytes of K0 are guessed to ompute
a
(2)
a,b and to share the ounters into herds; then selet a single herd and update nz by adding z = (c0, · · · , c3) for
eah y that is in the good herd; in the third phase, guess the ve key bytes of K7 and of K
′
6 to derypt eah z
to a single byte of A(6), sum this byte over all the 232 values of z (with multipliities) and hek for zero. This
last phase must be repeated for eah initial guess of the four bytes of K0.
The rst phase requires about 2120 trial enryptions and the rest of the attak has a negligible omplexity
ompared to it (see [5℄ for some details about the attak omplexity). Then, the total omplexity of this attak
is 2120 trial enryptions and 264 bits of memory using 2128 hosen plaintexts. The authors provide another
improvement of their attak remarking that the four plaintext bytes (p4, · · · , p7) and the four guessed key bytes
of K0 dene four bytes of A
(2)
. So they an reate 224 smaller herds with 2104 elements by xing three more
bytes of A(2) to redue the plaintext requirements to 2128 − 2119 texts.
So, we ould diretly apply this attak against 8 rounds version of Rijndael-192 and Rijndael-160. The
results are summed up in Table 3.
RR n° 0123456789
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Cipher nb Key Data Time Memory Attak
rounds sizes Complexity
Rijndael-192 8 (256) 2192 − 2119 CP 2192 − 2119 2192 − 2119
Rijndael-160 8 (256) 2160 − 2119 CP 2160 − 2119 2160 − 2119
Table 3: Summary of Attaks on Rijndael-192 and on Rijndael-160 using the herd tehnique
4 Conlusion
In this paper, we have investigated new 4-round integral properties of Rijndael-b for several b values and then
have built several dedued attaks up to 8 rounds. Note that those attaks are better than the ones desribed in
[9℄, in [8℄ and in [5℄ when applied to Rijndael-b but do not improve the one proposed in [7℄ against Rijndael-256.
However, we think that those new properties learly improve the better results known about Rijndael-b and
highlight the Rijndael-b behavior for integral ryptanalysis, notiing that the greater the number of olumns is
the lower the order of the integral is.
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